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The 1990s witnessed the success of the work-based welfare reform initiated with the 
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 
reducing welfare caseloads.  While welfare reform was effective in lowering immediate 
welfare dependency, researchers have questioned its long-run success in alleviating 
poverty partially due to the precariousness surrounding the jobs held by welfare leavers.  
This paper addresses this concern by examining (1) the likelihood of taking a contingent 
job given one’s welfare dependency and past poverty status; (2) the probability of being 
on welfare for different types of contingent workers relative to their non-contingent 
counterparts; and (3) the likelihood of living in poverty in the near future as a function 
of past employment in alternative types of contingent jobs.     1
I.    Introduction 
 
The 1990s witnessed the success of the work-based welfare reform initiated with the 
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 
reducing welfare caseloads.  While welfare-to-work programs were effective in lowering 
immediate welfare dependency and cutting administrative costs, researchers have questioned 
their long-run success in alleviating poverty (Blank and Ruggles 1994; Hoynes and MaCurdy 
1994; Handler 1995; Peck and Theodore 2000).  Part of the concern revolves around the type of 
jobs held by welfare leavers and their implications on the longer-run prospects of these 
individuals. 
Indeed, the 1996 welfare reform in the U.S. has been characterized by a “work-first” 
philosophy, which channeled participants into any available jobs with the hope that, once 
working, these individuals would become less likely to revert to poverty (Gueron and Pauly 
1991; Strawn 1998).  As noted by Peck and Theodore (2000), many of these jobs have been 
contingent jobs, often characterized by high turnover rates and low wages (Sawhill 1999).
1  
Given that many welfare leavers take contingent jobs, it is important to assess the relationship 
between contingent work and poverty alleviation.  In particular, given the heterogeneity of 
contingent jobs and the important role they often play in the economy, it is important to decipher 
which characteristics of contingent jobs are the most influential in affecting the likelihood of 
self-sufficiency of welfare leavers.
2  This information would help policymakers to identify and 
“tackle” the most dangerous job characteristics threatening the success of “work-first” welfare 
reform.  While many have assessed the success of welfare in terms of the reduction in welfare 
caseloads,
3 there have been few studies examining the relationship between welfare reform, the 
incidence of different types of contingent work, and poverty alleviation directly.
4   2
In this paper, we examine: (1) the likelihood of taking a contingent job given one’s 
welfare dependency and past poverty status; (2) the probability of being on welfare for different 
types of contingent workers relative to their non-contingent counterparts; and (3) the likelihood 
of living in poverty in the near future as a function of past employment in alternative types of 
contingent jobs.  Using data for women from the NLSY79 between 1994 and 1998, we first 
examine the incidence of poverty and welfare dependency among different types of contingent 
and non-contingent workers, and describe the personal and job characteristics associated with 
contingent employment.   
Following the descriptive evidence, we examine the relationship between welfare 
participation and contingent work.  Given the simultaneity of these outcomes, we estimate a 
simultaneous equation probit model with sample selection for being employed, while correcting 
the standard errors for clustering at the individual level.  Results from these models indicate that 
being on welfare has a significant positive effect on the probability of taking a contingent job.  
However, holding a contingent work contract does not, by itself, increase the likelihood of being 
on welfare once we control for other characteristics of the contingent job itself – such as the low 
pay, lack of fringe benefits, weekly hours of work, unionization, firm size, and industry of 
employment – and some of the worker’s characteristics – including educational attainment, 
occupation as a proxy for skill, tenure, and intermittent work patterns. 
Subsequently, we consider the possible broader implications of contingent work on a 
woman’s overall well being, as measured by her probability of living below the poverty line.  We 
use an instrumental variables approach to: (1) examine whether being poor in the previous year 
increases the probability of holding a contingent job, and (2) whether holding a contingent job 
raises the individual’s likelihood of life in poverty in the following year.
5  Given the   3
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables and the fact that our sample is limited to wage 
and salary earners, both instrumental variable models are estimated as maximum likelihood 
probits with sample selection.  To address the panel aspect of our dataset, we also correct the 
standard errors to reflect clustering at the individual level.  Our results suggest that living in 
poverty is associated with a higher likelihood of holding a contingent position.  This finding 
points to the frequently involuntary character of contingent work among these individuals, for 
whom economic need is one of the elements compelling them to take less-stable, lower-paying 
jobs.  Nonetheless, a contingent worker is no more likely to be poor a year later than is a similar 
worker in a standard employment relationship once we control for individual, job-related, 
regional, and macroeconomic characteristics.  Overall, the analysis provides an assessment of the 
importance of economic need and welfare reform in pushing individuals towards contingent 
work, as well as the role of these contracts and their diverse set of characteristics in ensuring 
self-sufficiency.     
 
II.   From Poverty and Welfare Dependency to Contingent Work and Back to Poverty 
The relationship between welfare reform, contingent work, and poverty is a complicated 
one.  With the passing of PRWORA in 1996, adults are required to engage in some type of work-
related activity after two years of receiving benefits and are limited to a cumulative five-years of 
individual participation.  As a result, welfare recipients have been increasingly entering the labor 
force and caseloads have fallen dramatically.  By the end of 1999, caseloads had fallen by about 
50 percent since the enactment of the new welfare law (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services).  Many welfare recipients have been steered towards contingent work arrangements.  
According to Lane et al. (2002), welfare agencies (e.g., New York City and Chicago) have used   4
temporary help agencies as a source of employment for individuals approaching their time limits.  
  While welfare reform may have pushed individuals into contingent positions after 1996, 
economic need, aside from its link to welfare, is also widely found as a reason for accepting a 
contingent job.  Economic necessity, defined as living below the poverty line, could push an 
individual to take a contingent job even when it pays low wages and does not offer fringe 
benefits.  According to the February 1999 Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements 
Supplement to the Current Population Survey, more than half of contingent workers reported that 
they would rather be employed in a non-contingent job and approximately one-third reported 
economic reasons (such as “only type of work one could find” or “hope leads to permanent 
employment”) for accepting contingent work (Hipple 2001).  In an analysis of the growth of 
temporary help supply between 1982 and 1992, Golden (1996) finds that the use of contingent 
workers is more demand-led (due to input strategies used by employers) than supply-led (due to 
worker preferences for these jobs).  Thus, it appears that contingent work arrangements may be 
largely involuntary in nature. 
Once in a contingent position, either due to welfare reform’s work-first initiative or to 
economic need, a worker may remain a low-income high risk individual.  Contingent positions 
frequently offer less job security, lower pay, and fewer benefits compared to non-contingent jobs 
(Segal and Sullivan 1997), and it is not always clear whether these positions are stepping stones 
to more permanent arrangements or dead-end jobs.  There are several arguments to suggest that 
the precarious nature of contingent positions may limit the likelihood of escaping poverty.  First, 
the intermittent career patterns and limited work attachment characteristic of contingent jobs not 
only result in a loss of human capital but, furthermore, are often accompanied by a lack of 
unemployment insurance due to the short duration of their jobs.
6  Both factors may contribute to   5
these workers’ observed poverty recidivism, even more so given their characteristic lack of 
means.
7   
Second, low wages are commonly believed to contribute to poverty.  Indeed, there is 
evidence that approximately 28 percent and 15 percent of the official 13 percent of the 
population living in poverty are low-wage workers working full-time and part-time, respectively 
(Bureau of the Census 1998).  These percentages may be even greater among workers in 
precarious work arrangements, as is often the case among contingent workers. 
Third, many of these poor workers held flexible work contracts offering no fringe 
benefits, such as health insurance, pension plans, or child care (Bugarin 1998; Peck and 
Theodore 2000).  The lack of fringe benefits, such as health insurance or even retirement benefits 
for the future, further threatens the ability of contingent workers to confront medical costs or to 
be self-sufficient in the future. 
In sum, the intermittent career pattern, limited work attachment, low wages, and lack of 
fringe benefits characteristic of contingent work arrangements may have contributed to these 
workers’ likelihood to fall back in poverty.  This seems to be the conclusion reached by previous 
studies.
8  However, the literature has failed to identify the role that each of these individual 
factors plays in threatening the self-sufficiency of workers in different types of contingent work 
arrangements – in particular, temporary agency work and direct-hire temporary work.  As 
previously discussed, this is an important exercise since “banning” the use of contingent work 
altogether does not seem an appropriate solution given the important function these contracts 
play in responding to the cyclical patterns of some industries.  Instead, deciphering the role 
played by different characteristics of these contingent jobs believed to be the most threatening to 
the success of welfare reform in terms of alleviating poverty and, subsequently tackling some of   6
these characteristics, appears more promising.  This is the intent of the analysis that follows.  
    
III.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The Data:  In this study, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79).  Since 1979, a large amount of labor market information has been collected from 
survey participants.  In particular, in the years 1994, 1996, and 1998, additional information was 
collected on the type of employment arrangement.  Specifically, respondents were asked for each 
job whether they were considered a “non-contingent employee”, a temp worker, a consultant or 
contractor, or an employee of a contractor.  Since our main focus in this paper is on the 
relationship between poverty, welfare, and contingent work, we limit our analysis to these years.   
In addition to standard firm-level, individual-level, and regional-level variables, we also 
use the NLSY79’s constructed poverty status variable.  This variable is calculated using the 
family income for the last calendar year and the Department of Health and Human Services 
poverty income guidelines.
 9  In addition, we categorize an individual as receiving welfare if they 
respond that they or their spouse “received any SSI or other public assistance/ welfare” during 
the year.  
In this study, we focus on the effects of welfare reform, poverty, and contingent 
employment for women.  Given that the vast majority of welfare recipients are women, we feel 
limiting our sample to only females allows us to examine the impact of welfare reform for the 
group considered to be most “at-risk” directly.  A list of the variables used in this analysis, their 
means, and standard deviations are provided in Table A in the appendix. 
   7
The Incidence of Poverty and Welfare Dependency Among Contingent Workers:  
 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the incidence of poverty and welfare receipt among 
different types of contingent and non-contingent female workers between 1994 and 1998.  To 
start, we observe that the incidence of poverty (in the previous and following year) for contingent 
workers is over double the poverty rate of non-contingent workers.  Almost one in four agency 
temps qualified as poor compared to only eleven percent of non-contingent workers.  
Furthermore, contingent workers are not only more likely to have been on welfare in the past 
year but, in addition, they are also considerably more likely to receive welfare in the next year 
than their counterparts in more traditional job arrangements.  Therefore, it is immediately 
apparent that there is a link between contingent work, poverty, and welfare receipt. 
Who are the contingent workers? 
As an introduction to the differences in personal characteristics between those taking a 
contingent job and those with a more traditional position, Table 2 provides a comparison for 
female workers in non-contingent and contingent arrangements between 1994 and 1998.  
Tabulations are presented for agency temps, all temps (including both agency temps and direct-
hire temps), and all workers in non-standard work arrangements (NSWA).  Those categorized as 
non-standard workers include agency temps, direct-hire temps, consultants, independent 
contractors, and employees of contractors. 
Personal characteristics significantly associated with being a contingent worker include 
race, years of education, marital status, and family size.  For example, temporary workers 
(including both agency temps and direct-hire temps) are less likely than the average worker in a 
traditional job to be white and they have about a year less education than those with a permanent 
position.  Less than half of all temporary workers are married compared to nearly sixty percent   8
of women in permanent positions and they tend to have smaller families.  For all workers in non-
standard work arrangements, many of the comparisons still hold.  Despite their heterogeneity, 
workers in non-standard work arrangements have somewhat fewer years of education and 
smaller families than non-contingent workers.  However, their race and marital status are no 
longer significantly different from that of their non-contingent counterparts.  
 
What is the nature of contingent positions? 
Table 3 summarizes work-related characteristics of contingent and non-contingent jobs.  
Temporary workers tend to earn an average of $2 per hour less than non-contingent workers, 
have, on average, only 61 weeks of tenure relative to an average of 255 weeks of non-contingent 
workers, and spend nearly five times as long unemployed as their non-contingent counterparts.   
Contingent employees are also less likely to be offered fringe benefits.  While three-
fourths of non-contingent workers received health insurance, less than one-quarter of contingent 
employees enjoyed this benefit.  A similar pattern is also found with respect to retirement 
benefits, with only 16 percent of all temps having this benefit relative to 66 percent of non-
contingent workers.  Finally, contingent workers are more likely to work at smaller firms and 
less likely to be unionized relative to their non-contingent counterparts.   
Occupation and industry distributions across contract type, shown in Table 4, reveal that 
temporary employees are less concentrated in high-skilled jobs and more heavily concentrated in 
certain sectors.  Specifically, female temporary workers are primarily employed in clerical and 
operator positions and are concentrated in manufacturing and business services.  Meanwhile, 
female workers in more traditional (non-contingent work) are more represented in professional, 
managerial, and service jobs.  By sector, women in non-contingent positions are most 
concentrated in professional services and trade.  These differences, however, essentially   9
disappear when comparing all women in non-standard work arrangements to those in non-
contingent jobs.  Again, this is partially due to the fact that the alternative work arrangement 
category contains, in addition to temporary workers, workers who are consultants and 
contractors.   
 
IV.  Contingent Work and Welfare Participation: Empirical Methodology 
  We first start by examining the relationship between welfare participation and contingent 
work.   We distinguish among different types of contingent work: temporary work through a 
temporary help agency, temporary work – whether it takes place through a temporary help 
agency or through direct hiring – and non-standard work – which encompasses any type of job 
that is not a permanent job.  As indicated by our results in the previous section and earlier 
research, contingent work is highly correlated with age, gender, race, educational attainment and 
marital status (Polivka 1996).  Additionally, contingent workers are frequently placed in 
professional, service, administrative support, and labor occupations, as well as in the service and 
construction industries and smaller firms (Pardo 1992; Polivka 1996; Mavromaras and Rudolph 
1998; and Gong, Van Soest, and Villagomez 2001).  Furthermore, some studies have also argued 
the existence of a link between contingent work and a series of regional and macroeconomic 
descriptors.  In particular, contingent work appears more frequent in urban areas and areas with 
relatively low unemployment rates (Otoo 1999; Peck and Theodore 2001).  Therefore, we 
describe the likelihood of working in a contingent job as a function of a broad set of personal 
characteristics (Pit,1)– such as age, race, educational attainment, family size, marital status, and 
health; job related characteristics (Jit,1)– such as occupation, industry, and firm size; regional 
characteristics (Rit,1)– such as whether the respondent lives in an urban and a high/low 
unemployment rate area; and economy wide trends captured by year dummy variables (δ 1t).    10
Furthermore, since the “work first” philosophy of welfare reform might have “pushed” some 
welfare recipients into accepting contingent jobs even if they preferred a permanent job, we also 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is on welfare in the contingent work 
equation (Welfareit).  As a result, the likelihood of holding a contingent job can be described as:   
(1)  Contingentit = α 1Pit,1+β 1Jit,1+χ 1Rit,1+δ 1t+φ 1Welfareit+ν it . 
Similarly, aside from similar personal characteristics to those determining the likelihood 
of holding a contingent job (included in Pit,2),
10 welfare participation is likely to be related to 
specific job-related characteristics (captured in Jit,2), such as the hourly wage, weekly hours of 
work, the receipt of job benefits, tenure, and union membership to the extent that unions press 
for better employment conditions that guarantee a minimum standard of living (Peck and 
Theodore 2000).  Additionally, we include the respondent’s type of work contract (Contingentit), 
which we use to test whether the contingent nature of the job on its own has an effect on the 
probability of receiving welfare.  Finally, it is well-accepted that (poverty and) welfare 
participation are highly correlated spatially (Jargowsky 1997); therefore, we also include a series 
of regional characteristics (Rit,2) and time dummies (δ 2t) capturing macroeconomic trends 
potentially influencing the individual’s likelihood of being on welfare.  As a result, welfare 
participation can be described as given by: 
(2)  Welfareit = α 2Pit,2+β 2Jit,2+χ 2Rit,2+δ 2t+φ 2Contingentit+υ it . 
  Given the simultaneity of welfare participation and contingent employment, we estimate 
equations (1)-(2) as simultaneous equation probits (Maddala 1983, pp. 246-247).  Equation (1) is 
econometrically identified by the exclusion of a dummy variable indicating that the respondent 
lives in a neighborhood with problems (e.g. a neighborhood with crime and violence or 
abandoned and run-down buildings) from equation (1) and its inclusion in equation (2).  While   11
welfare recipients are more likely to reside in lower income areas and neighborhoods with 
problems (Jaworsky 1997), living in a problematic neighborhood is not, by itself, a determinant 
of contingent employment other than through economic need and poverty, already accounted for 
in the estimation through the welfare participation term.  Similarly, equation (2) is identified by 
the exclusion of firm size and industry dummies as determinants of welfare participation other 
than through contingent work, and their inclusion in equation (1) as factors found to be highly 
correlated with the incidence of contingent work (Pardo 1992; Polivka 1996; Mavromaras and 
Rudolph 1998; and Gong, Van Soest, and Villagomez 2001).   
Additionally, due to our focus on working individuals, each probit model is estimated as 
a maximum likelihood probit with sample selection allowing for clustering at the individual 
level.  The appropriate variance-covariance matrix is subsequently computed following Maddala 
(1983).
11  In this manner, the analysis accounts for the potential endogeneity of welfare 
participation and contingent employment, the sample selection incurred when focusing on 
strictly working individuals, and for the individual specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
contaminating the standard errors.   
  
V.  From Contingent Work to Welfare or from Welfare to Contingent Work? 
  Table 5 shows the results from estimating the simultaneous equation probit models of the 
respondent’s likelihood of being employed in any of the different types of contingent jobs being 
considered and of their likelihood of being on welfare.  The major finding is the significant effect 
that being on welfare displays on the likelihood of being in a contingent job, regardless of the 
specific type of contingent work arrangement being considered.  Particularly, being on welfare 
raises the likelihood of being employed as an agency temp, as either an agency temp or a direct 
hire temp, and as a non-standard worker by as much as 5 percent, 8 percent, and 17 percent,   12
respectively.  This result corroborates the “work-first” philosophy that the literature has 
emphasized about welfare programs (Gueron and Pauly 1991; Strawn 1998; Peck and Theodore 
2000).  Additionally, in line with the previous literature on contingent work,
12 we find contingent 
work to be related to a series of personal, job, and regional characteristics.  In particular once we 
control for other personal, job, and regional characteristics, contingent employment appears to be 
less likely among black women, women with health problems, and women with larger families, 
while it seems more common among married women.  Relative to non-contingent work, 
contingent work is generally more frequent in the construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
communications, public utilities, business services, and public administration.  Lastly, contingent 
employment seems more frequent in areas with low unemployment rates and less prominent after 
1994.
13   
However, unlike previously suggested, holding a contingent work contract – whether the 
latter is a temporary work contract through a temporary help agency, through direct hire, or, in 
general, a non-permanent work contract – does not, by itself, increase the individual’s likelihood 
of being on welfare once we control for the major job characteristics.  In particular, we find that 
– aside from personal characteristics, such as race, poor health, family size, and marital status – a 
reduced number of weekly hours of work along with the lack of health benefits are the two major 
job characteristics associated with the respondent’s likelihood of receiving public assistance.  
Specifically, it is the lack of health benefits that displays an economically important effect on the 
individual’s likelihood of being on welfare, raising it by as much as 19 percent for non-standard 
workers relative to permanent full-time workers.  The lack of health insurance is worrisome to 
the extent that poor health appears to be significantly higher among individuals on welfare.  
Additionally, as found for contingent work and by previous literature on welfare,
14 welfare   13
participation appears to be highly correlated to various personal and neighborhood 
characteristics.  In particular, black women, women with health problems, and women with 
larger families appear more likely to be receiving public assistance, while married women are 
significantly less likely.  The latter result, in particular, has been the basis for promoting 
marriage as a means to reduce welfare dependency by the Bush’s campaign.  Finally, as argued 
by Jargowsky (1997), welfare receipt appears to be spatially concentrated in poorer and 
problematic neighborhoods.         
 
VI.  Contingent Work and Poverty: Empirical Methodology 
  We now turn to examine the potential and broader implications that contingent work 
might have on the likelihood of life in poverty.  As in our previous analysis, we distinguish 
among different types of contingent work: temporary work through a temp agency, temporary 
work – whether it is through a temp agency or through direct hiring, and non-standard work.  To 
our previous specification of the likelihood of working in a contingent job, we now add two 
terms.  First, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the individual was deemed poor 
during the previous year (Povertyit-1).
15  To the extent that contingent work often displays an 
involuntary nature, it is also likely to be related to the respondent’s financial situation.  In 
particular, individuals undergoing greater financial difficulty might feel compelled to take a 
contingent job even if they would rather be employed in a permanent job.  Additionally, given 
the exogeneity exhibited by welfare participation as a determinant of contingent work, we 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was on welfare during the previous 
year (Welfareit-1), as well as an interaction term of being on welfare during the previous year and 
the year 1998 (Welfareit-1*Year 1998).  While the previous analysis revealed the role played by 
welfare reform in “pushing” people into contingent type jobs, the interaction term captures the   14
growth rate in contingent employment for previous year welfare recipients versus non-welfare 
recipients from after 1998.  Therefore, our new contingent work equation is given by:   
(3)  Contingentit = α 3Pit,3+β 3Jit,3+χ 3Rit,3+δ 3t+φ 3Povertyit-1+γ 3Welfareit-1  
+η 3 (Welfareit-1*Year 1998)+ϖ it
16. 
  Before estimating equation (3), a couple of econometric issues are worth noticing.  First, 
as in the previous section, our analysis is constrained to working individuals; therefore, we need 
to correct for the sample selection incurred.  Secondly, due to state dependence, the error terms 
in the contingent work equation are likely to be serially correlated.  Under this scenario, last year 
poverty, despite being predetermined is likely to be endogenous (Greene 2000).  As a result, 
individuals on contingent jobs, possibly due to their interrupted career patterns, low wages, and 
lack of fringe benefits, may be more likely to become poor than their non-contingent 
counterparts.  Therefore, we need to instrument last year poverty in our estimation.  Given the 
dichotomous nature of our dependent variable and the use of past (versus simultaneous) year 
poverty, we estimate a maximum likelihood probit with sample selection and instrument 
Povertyit-1 using the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood 
with problems (e.g. a neighborhood with crime and violence or abandoned and run-down 
buildings) provided the spatial concentration of poverty (Jargowsky 1997).  Finally, standard 
errors are corrected to account for clustering at the individual level.  
  A similar exercise is completed to examine the role of contingent work on the 
respondent’s likelihood of life in poverty.  Specifically, as with welfare participation, life in 
poverty may be described as a function of similar personal, job related, regional, and 
macroeconomic factors.  To the variables included in equation (2), we add the number of weeks 
unemployed in the Jit,4 vector as a proxy for the individual’s intermittent work pattern often   15
leading to a greater likelihood of life in poverty.  As a result, we can express the individual’s 
likelihood of living in poverty in the next year as a function of: 
(4)  Povertyit+1 = α 4Pit,4 + β 4Jit,4 + χ 4Rit,4 +δ 4t + ϕ 4Contingentit + ξ it . 
As with equation (3), the estimation of equation (4) is restricted to working individuals.  
Similarly, while contingent work is predetermined, is likely to be endogenous.  This is likely to 
be the case if contingent jobs display a rather involuntary nature and individuals accept these 
jobs when confronted with economic need.  Therefore, we estimate a maximum likelihood probit 
with sample selection and instrument Contingentit using firm size and industry dummies, as in 
previous sections.  Lastly, as in the estimation of the instrumental variable maximum likelihood 
with sample selection for contingent work, standard errors are corrected to reflect the clustering 
at the individual level.  
 
VII.  Does Contingent Work Increase the Likelihood of Being Poor or Vice Versa? 
  The analysis in the previous sections revealed how welfare participation increases the 
likelihood of holding a contingent job, but contingent employment in itself does not increase 
welfare dependency.  While interesting, the analysis in Table 5 did not allow us to assess, even 
indirectly, whether welfare reform after 1996 has increased the growth rate of contingent work 
among welfare participants versus non-welfare participants.  Additionally, while the previous 
analysis uncovered the link between welfare dependency and contingent work, it did not explore 
the implications of contingent work on poverty.  As argued by Schiller (2001), the ultimate goal 
of social policy should not be to lower welfare caseloads but, rather, to reduce poverty.  
Therefore, it is important to examine the implications that holding a particular type of work 
contract might have on the respondent’s likelihood of life in poverty.  The analysis in Table 6 
addresses both of these important questions.     16
  In particular, with respect to contingent work, it is important to note that being poor in the 
previous year appears to make respondents up to 4 percent more likely to be employed in a 
contingent job.  While significant, this effect is smaller than the simultaneous effect of 
contingent work on welfare participation displayed in Table 5.  Furthermore, the interaction term 
in Table 6 reveals the potentially important role played by welfare and, particularly, welfare 
reform.  According to the latter, there has been a significant growth in the rate of contingent 
work, particularly direct hire temporary work and non-standard work, among previous welfare 
participants relative to non-welfare participants after 1996.  The magnitude of this effect gets 
especially large in the equations for all temporary work and all non-standard work, both of which 
display growth rates for all temporary work and non-standard work of approximately 60 percent 
and 71 percent, respectively, among welfare recipients after 1996.  This result points to the 
potential role that welfare reform might have played in changing the composition of contingent 
employment.  Finally, as Table 5 did in the previous section, Table 6 uncovers a series of 
personal, job related, regional, and time trend characteristics of contingent work.  Specifically, 
contingent work appears more likely among married women; women employed at smaller firms; 
women employed in manufacturing, business services, and public administration; and women 
living in urban areas.  In addition, contingent work overall was less prominent after 1994.    
  Secondly, it is of interest to observe how, as in the case of welfare participation, being 
employed in a contingent job does not increase the individual’s likelihood of life in poverty once 
we control for other job related characteristics.  In fact, the likelihood of life in poverty is 
between 3 percent and 4 percent lower among all temps and non-standard workers, respectively.  
It is the wage, weekly hours of work, benefits received on the job, the respondent’s tenure and 
her intermittent career pattern – as reflected by the total number of weeks unemployed, that   17
appear to be related to the respondent’s likelihood of life in poverty; but not the type of work 
contract held per se.  In particular, health and retirement benefits display an economically large 
impact on poverty, reducing its likelihood by as much as 6 percent.  As found by Dutton (1993), 
Owen (1994), and Seeborg (1996), other personal and regional characteristics play a significant 
role on respondents’ likelihood of life in poverty as well.  For instance, having one additional 
year of school completed and being married seems to lower the incidence rate of poverty at the 
individual level by approximately 1 percent and 10 percent, respectively.  Poor women are also 
more likely to have health problems, to have larger families, to live in urban areas and in 




The 1996 welfare reform has been characterized by a “work-first” philosophy according 
to which placing welfare recipients into any available jobs would lead to a reduction of welfare 
dependency and welfare recidivism (Gueron and Pauly 1991; Strawn 1998).  Nonetheless, 
researchers have questioned the long-run success of the PRWORA in alleviating poverty (Blank 
and Ruggles 1994; Hoynes and MaCurdy 1994; Handler 1995; Peck and Theodore 2000).  In 
particular, many have argued the type of jobs held by welfare leavers as the major impediment 
for them to reach self-sufficiency (Peck and Theodore 2000).   
In this paper, we use data on women from the NLSY79 for the years 1994, 1996, and 
1998 to examine: (1) the likelihood of taking a contingent job given one’s welfare dependency 
and past poverty status; (2) the probability of being on welfare for different types of contingent 
workers relative to their non-contingent counterparts; and (3) the likelihood of living in poverty 
in the near future as a function of their past employment in alternative types of contingent jobs.     18
Various findings are worth emphasizing.  First, we find that holding a contingent job does not, 
by itself, increase the individual’s likelihood of life in poverty in the near future nor her 
likelihood of being on welfare once we account for other work related characteristics.  Instead, it 
is the low pay, limited work attachment – as captured by the weekly hours of work and the 
number of weeks unemployed in the year, and lack of fringe benefits in the case of poverty, and 
the limited work attachment and lack of fringe benefits in the case of welfare, that significantly 
raise the likelihood of each state.    
Secondly, we find that being on welfare does, however, increase the individual’s 
likelihood of having a contingent job by as much as 17 percent.  Furthermore, the growth rate of 
contingent work among previous year welfare participants relative to non-welfare participants 
significantly rose after 1996, providing empirical evidence of the “work-first” philosophy of 
welfare reform emphasized in the literature.   
Finally, living in poverty also raises the individual’s likelihood of holding a contingent 
job in the near future by as much as 4 percent, possibly reflecting the frequently involuntary 
nature of contingent employment.   
In sum, our findings provide an assessment of the importance of economic need and 
welfare reform in changing the composition of contingent work in the United States, as well as 
of the role played by different types of contingent work contracts and their diverse set of 
characteristics in ensuring self-sufficiency.       19
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Table 1  
 Incidence of Poverty and Welfare Receipt Across Different Types of Contingent Workers (Women only) 
 
  Agency Temps vs. Non-
contingent 
All Temps vs. Non-contingent  Non-Standard vs. Non-
contingent 
Characteristics  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat 
Past Year Poverty           
Temporary  .23    .23    .18   
Non-contingent .11  -.12  -3.19 .11  -.13  -5.00 .11  -.08  -5.00 
Next Year Poverty           
Temporary  .22    .24    .18   
Non-contingent .11  -.11  -2.88 .11  -.13  -5.02 .11  -.07  -4.66 
Past Year On Welfare           
Temporary  .09    .09    .09   
Non-contingent .03  -.06  -2.78 .03  -.06  -4.18 .03  -.06  -4.18 
Next Year On Welfare           
Temporary  .05    .07    .05   
Non-contingent .02  -.03  -1.68 .02  -.05  -3.41 .02  -.03  -3.46 
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Table 2  
 Personal Characteristics of Contingent and Non-contingent Employees (Women only) 
 
  Agency Temps vs. Non-
contingent 
All Temps vs. Non-contingent  Non-Standard vs. Non-
contingent 
Characteristics  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat 
Age           
Temporary  34.9    34.9    35.0   
Non-contingent  35.0 .09 .43  35.0 .08 .58  35.0  -.00  -.03 
Race (white)           
Temporary  .41    .50    .64   
Non-contingent .65 .24  6.14 .65 .15  5.79 .65 .01 .64 
Race (black)           
Temporary  .53    .41    .29   
Non-contingent .29  -.24  -5.91 .29  -.12  -2.25 .29 .00 .12 
Years of Education           
Temporary  12.54    12.62    13.11   
Non-contingent  13.34 .80  4.90  13.34 .72  5.52  13.34 .22  2.42 
Married           
Temporary  .39    .47    .58   
Non-contingent .58 .18  4.72 .58 .10  3.93 .58  -.01  -.58 
Family Size           
Temporary  3.28    3.54    3.56   
Non-contingent 3.38  .10  .85 3.38 -.16  -2.01 3.38 -.18  -3.21 
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Table 3  
 Job Characteristics of Contingent and Non-contingent Employees (Women only) 
 
  Agency Temps vs. Non-
contingent 
All Temps vs. Non-contingent  Non-Standard vs. Non-
contingent 
Characteristics  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat  Mean Diff.  t-stat 
Hourly Wage           
Temporary 5.34     5.59     7.66     
Non-contingent 7.61 2.28 8.21 7.61 2.02 7.87 7.62 -.04 -.11 
Weekly Hours           
Temporary 19.07     14.42     16.88     
Non-contingent 30.07 11.00  6.94 30.07 15.65 16.07 30.07 13.19 18.44 
Weeks Unemployed           
Temporary  11.78    10.29    5.95   
Non-contingent 2.45  -9.33  -5.58 2.45  -7.84  -7.63 2.45  -3.50  -6.25 
Tenure           
Temporary  47.79    60.74    122.34   
Non-contingent 255.79 207.99  30.45 255.79 195.05  33.59 255.79 133.46  21.76 
Health Benefits           
Temporary .23     .26     .26     
Non-contingent .77 .54  13.84 .77 .52  17.81 .77 .51  25.01 
Retirement Benefits           
Temporary .09     .16     .17     
Non-contingent .66 .57  20.71 .66 .50  20.38 .66 .49  27.51 
Firm Size           
Temporary 337.69     339.13     197.28     
Non-contingent 484.14 146.45  1.19 484.14 145.02  2.14 484.14 286.87  7.24 
Union           
Temporary .02     .06     .04     
Non-contingent .14 .12  9.71 .14 .08  5.90 .14 .10  10.57 
   25
Table 4 











Occupation       
Professional 21.85  6.08 13.25  18.02 
Manager  13.24 4.05 4.22  10.17 
Sales 4.15 2.03 3.92  6.54 
Clerical 28.31 42.57 34.94  22.67 
Craftsmen 2.08 1.35 2.41  2.47 
Operators  8.10 29.73 17.17  9.16 
Laborers 1.73 8.78 6.33  4.07 
Farm .40 .68  2.41  1.89 
Service 19.21  4.73 14.16  19.48 
Private Household  .93  .00  1.20  5.52 
      
Industry       
Agriculture/Mining 1.32  .00 2.54  2.88 
Construction 1.29  .70 1.59  1.60 
Manufacturing 11.63 26.57 16.83  11.06 
Transportation, Communication and Public Utilities  4.42  3.50  2.22  2.08 
Trade 18.16  6.29 12.38  14.74 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  8.11  5.59  3.49  2.72 
Business  Services  5.76 45.45 24.13  18.75 
Personal  Services 6.21 2.80 3.81  15.54 
Recreational Services  1.32  .70  2.22  2.56 
Professional Services  35.61  6.29  23.17  23.56 
Public  Administration 6.18 2.10 7.62  4.49 
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Table 5 
Estimated Coefficients from Simultaneous Equation Probit Models with Sample Selection for  
Different Type of Contingent Work and Welfare Receipt 
(Standard Errors)  
[Marginal Effects] 
 
  Agency Temps  All Temps  NSWA 
Variables Contingent 
Work 
On Welfare  Contingent 
Work 
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Table 5  -- Continued 
 
  Agency Temps  All Temps  NSWA 
Variables Contingent 
Work 
On Welfare  Contingent 
Work 
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Table 5  -- Continued 
 
  Agency Temps  All Temps  NSWA 
Variables Contingent 
Work 
On Welfare  Contingent 
Work 























































































Number  of  Observations  6665 6660 6665 6660 6665 6665 
Log  Likelihood  -3865.04 -4169.94 -4050.58 -4169.94 -4214.86 -4172.01 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level.    All regressions include a constant term and occupation dummies.       29
Table 6 
Estimated Coefficients for the Instrumental Variable Probits with Sample Selection for  
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Table 6 - Continued 
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Table 6 - Continued 
 


































































































No.  of  Observations  7450 5633 7450 5633 7450 5633 
Log  Likelihood  -4255.84 -4213.19 -4525.03 -4211.34 -4936.16 -4211.17 
    
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level.    All regressions include a constant term and occupation dummies.    The variable 
past year poverty in the contingent work instrumental variable probits with sample selection is instrumented using 
problematic neighborhood, along with other exogenous regressors included in the instrumental variable probit.  The 
variable contingent work in the next year poverty instrumental variable probits with sample selection is instrumented 
using firm size and industry dummies, along with other exogenous regressors included in the instrumental variable 
probit.   
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Appendix -- Table A 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
 
  All  Agency Temps  All Temps  Non-Standard 
Work 
Variables  Means  Means  Means S.D. Means S.D. Means S.D. 
Age  34.90 2.74 34.88 2.64 34.88 2.77 34.97 2.77 
White  .64 .48 .41 .49 .50 .50 .64 .48 
Black  .30 .46 .53 .50 .41 .49 .29 .45 
Other  Race  .06 .24 .06 .24 .09 .29 .07 .26 
Years  of  Education  13.14 2.44 12.54 2.04 12.61 2.47 13.11 2.58 
Poor  Health  .05 .22 .05 .23 .06 .24 .07 .26 
Family  Size  3.52 1.58 3.28 1.47 3.54 1.52 3.56 1.53 
Married  .58 .49 .39 .49 .47 .50 .59 .49 
Divorced  .14 .35 .20 .40 .18 .39 .15 .35 
Young  Child  in  HH  .09 .27 .03 .17 .05 .21 .08 .27 
On  Welfare  .06 .07 .07 .25 .08 .27 .06 .24 
Poverty  .15 .23 .23 .42 .23 .42 .18 .39 
Non-contingent  Contract  .92  .27  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Temporary Contract 
(Agency or Direct Hire) 
.03  .18  1 0 1 0  .44  .50 
Agency  Temp  .01  .12 1  0 .43  .50  .19  .39 
Real  Hourly  Wage  7.59 6.84 5.34 3.36 5.59 4.71 7.66  10.68 
Weekly  Hours  of  Work  24.21 20.02 19.07 19.92 14.42 18.43 16.88 20.00 
Health  Benefits  .74 .44 .23 .42 .26 .44 .26 .44 
Retirement  Benefits  .63 .48 .09 .29 .16 .36 .17 .37 
Weeks  Unemployed  2.87  10.98 11.78 20.59 10.29 19.15  5.95  15.61 
Tenure  203.04 239.63  47.81  79.75  60.74  100.45 122.34 161.35 
Professional  .22 .41 .06 .24 .13 .34 .18 .38 
Manager  .13 .34 .04 .20 .04 .20 .10 .30 
Sales  .04 .20 .02 .14 .04 .19 .07 .25 
Clerical  .28 .45 .43 .50 .35 .48 .23 .42 
Craftsman  .02 .14 .01 .12 .02 .15 .02 .16 
Operative  .08 .27 .30 .46 .17 .38 .09 .29 
Laborer  .02 .14 .09 .28 .06 .24 .04 .20 
Farm  .01 .07 .01 .08 .02 .15 .02 .14 
Service  .19 .39 .05 .21 .14 .35 .19 .40 
Private  Household  .01 .11  --  --  .01 .11 .06 .23 
Agriculture  &  Mining .01  .12 --  -- .03  .16  .03  .17 
Construction  .01 11 .01 .08 .02 .13 .02 .13 




.04 .20 .03 .18 .02 .15 .02 .14 
Trade  .18 .38 .06 .24 .12 .33 .15 .35 
Finance  &  Insurance  .08 .27 .06 .23 .03 .18 .03 .16 
Business  Services  .07 .25 .45 .50 .24 .43 .19 .39 
Personal  Services  .07 .26 .03 .17 .04 .19 .16 .36 
Recreation  Services  .01 .12 .01 .08 .02 .15 .03 .16 
Professional  Services  .35 .48 .06 .24 .23 .42 .24 .42 
Public  Administration  .06 .24 .02 .14 .08 .27 .04 .21 
Firm  Size  380.14 1979.05 337.69 1314.98 339.13 1108.21 197.28  873.95 
Union  Member  .13 .34 .02 .14 .06 .24 .04 .19   33
Table A - Continued 
 
  All  Agency Temps  All Temps  Non-Standard 
Work 
Variables  Means S.D. Means S.D. Means S.D. Means S.D. 
Problematic 
Neighborhood 
.11 .31 .20 .40 .20 .40 .13 .34 
Urban  .77 .42 .82 .39 .79 .41 .79 .41 
Low  Unemployment  .05 .22 .07 .25 .05 .22 .05 .22 
High  Unemployment  .16 .37 .07 .24 .14 .35 .16 .37 
Year  1994  .34 .47 .29 .45 .32 .47 .32 .47 
Year  1996  .33 .47 .38 .49 .37 .48 .37 .48 
Year  1998  .33 .47 .33 .47 .31 .46 .31 .46 
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1 To make matters worse, there is concern that the massive number of placements taking place under welfare reform 
are likely to have resulted in a greater number of job displacements and lower wages for the entire workforce and, in 
particular, for the most disadvantaged workers (Tilly 1996 and Mishel et al. 1999).   
2 That is, whether it is the low pay, lack of fringe benefits, low weekly hours of work, frequent intermittent career 
pattern associated with contingent employment, low unionization rate, or any other characteristics imbedded in the 
classification of a job as contingent. 
3 See Council of Economic Advisors (1997). 
4 Previous studies have examined the link between welfare receipt and full-time year round work (Cancian et al. 
1999).  However, until recently, the literature has not analyzed the links between welfare receipt and contingent 
work.  In particular, Heinrich et al. (2002) examine the link between welfare receipt and temporary agency 
employment using data from Missouri and North Carolina.  Unlike the aforementioned study, however, the analysis 
in this paper examines the relationship between welfare receipt and different types of contingent work arrangements 
while taking into consideration the possible endogeneity between temporary work and welfare receipt.  In addition, 
our analysis isolates the role played by the contingent nature of the job held from that of unemployment spells, low 
wages, lack of benefits, state dependence on welfare, and personal characteristics in escaping poverty.   
5 By strictly focusing on welfare leavers, the literature has failed to provide a comparative analysis of the incidence 
of contingent jobs among former welfare-recipients and non-former welfare-recipients or the role played by 
contingent employment in guaranteeing the self-sufficiency of former welfare and non-welfare-recipients.  These 
comparative analyses are of interest because they help evaluate the effectiveness of welfare-reform as well as 
contingent employment in helping individuals escape poverty.   
6 As noted by Reich (2001) in The New York Times: “Eligibility rules have grown steadily tighter.  Since part-time 
workers, temps, the self-employed and people who have moved in and out of unemployment often don’t qualify, a 
large fraction of the lower-wage work force is excluded.” 
7 See Blank and Ruggles (1994) for a discussion of poverty recidivism among welfare leavers.   
8 Handler (1995) shows that welfare recipients using temporary work arrangements as a stepping-stone often return 
to the welfare rolls following job loss.  Similarly, Gosling et al. (1997) argue that temporary employment may lead 
to low-pay-unemployment cyclic career pattern and, therefore, to reiterative episodes of life in poverty.   
9 Since December 1965, there have been two slightly different versions of the federal poverty measure:  poverty 
thresholds and poverty guidelines.  Issued by the Census Bureau, poverty thresholds are used for calculating the 
number of persons in poverty in the United States or in states and regions.  Poverty guidelines, which are used in this 
paper, are the administrative version of the poverty measure and are issued by the HHS. They are a simplification of 
the poverty thresholds and are used in determining financial eligibility for certain federal programs.   
(http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/faqs/faq7.htm) and (http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm) 
10 For instance, previous research has found a significant correlation between poverty/welfare participation and race, 
marital status, family size, health, and educational attainment (Dutton 1993; Rexroat 1993; Bronars and Grogger 
1994; Owen 1994; and Seeborg 1996). 
11 The selection equations for being working include the following controls: age, race, educational attainment, health 
status of the respondent, family size, a dummy variable indicating the presence of children less than two years old, 
marital status, dummy variables indicating whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area, an area with high 
or low unemployment rate, and year dummies.  The selection equations are identified by the exclusion of the 
dummy variable indicating the presence of young children in the household – always statistically significant and 
inversely related to workforce participation – from the structural equations.  Results from the selection regressions 
are available from the authors upon request.    
12 See Pardo (1992); Polivka (1996); Mavromaras and Rudolph (1998); Otoo (1999); and Gong, Van Soest, and 
Villagomez (2001). 
13 It should be noted that this finding of a decline in the use of contingent employment is pointing towards a decline 
in the number of individuals who report that a contingent job is their primary job.  For temporary workers, the 
decline is approximately 2 percent for our time period under study.  Our results refer to workers and do not give an 
estimate of the growth in the number of temporary jobs over this time period, which can diverge due to changes in 
multiple job holdings and reporting by establishments (Lane et al. 2002)  
14 See Dutton (1993); Owen (1994); and Seeborg (1996), for example. 
15 Due to the nature of the question asked in the NLSY79, data are only available on poverty status for the year prior 
to the survey year.  All other labor market variables used in this paper relate to the current year.   35
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Data on income and, thus, the poverty status refers to the previous year.  As a result, there is a lag between the 
individual’s contingent work status and the poverty status.  